












Piracy off the Horn of Africa has grown substantially in recent years: 217 ships 
reported being attacked by Somali pirates during 2009. Although less than one 
percent of ships transiting the Gulf of Aden in 2009 suffered attacks, Somali piracy 
creates considerable economic costs and distortions. Some ships now routinely avoid 
the region and the estimated additional costs of specialty marine risk insurance for 
ships using the Gulf of Aden trade route were estimated to be in the region of US$ 
400mn for 2009.  International naval forces (including missions from the EU and 
NATO) are present in the Gulf of Aden to ensure the delivery of food aid to displaced 
people in Somalia, to protect shipping in the Gulf of Aden and to deter pirates from 
operating in the region.
In our research we show that the naval presence has prevented an explosion of piracy 
in the Gulf of Aden, but does not appear to have had a significant deterrent effect on 
pirates. Some ship owners gamble that they will not be attacked and do not co-operate 
with the navy, thereby providing easy targets for pirates. In the meantime pirates’ risk 
of injury, detention and trial in encounters with the navies remains relatively low. 
In any case sea-based naval operations will have limited success as long as Somalia 
remains a failed state. However, we show that partial improvements in local stability 
and governance are likely to increase pirate attacks. Therefore the most promising solu-
tion of the piracy problem would be to establish and fund a Somali coastguard. This 
would enforce both anti-piracy laws and stop illegal fishing off the coast of Somalia, 
providing new opportunities for economic for Somalia’s coastal communities.
Our research examines the success of the counter-piracy operations off the coast 
of Somalia.1 The analysis is based on a statistical model of pirate attacks from 
January 2002-June 2009 as well as interviews with naval officers and experts. We 
also examine the effect of the lack of effective government in Somalia on piracy, 
to explore the potential of proposed land-based approaches for resolving the piracy 
problem.





A long tradition of piracy
A low level of opportunistic and small scale pirate 
activity has taken place in the Gulf of Aden and the 
Somali Basin for many years. Initially the attacks 
were mostly acts of theft or extortion and mainly 
targeted foreign trawlers fishing illegally off the 
Somali coast and depriving coastal communities 
of their livelihoods. Pirates used small open boats 
(skiffs) and basic weaponry and were restricted in 
their operations. The collapse of political and civil 
order in Somalia and the absence of central law 
enforcement in the coastal regions meant that pi-
rates could vastly increase the profitability of their 
activities by hijacking and holding ships for ransom. 
Attacks increased in frequency and audacity. Data 
from the International Maritime Bureau attribute 
47 pirate attacks to Somali pirates in 2005, rising to 
119 in 2008 and 217 in 2009. The types of incidents 
range from hijacking of yachts and fishing vessels 
to attacks on valuable cargo ships and tankers. In 
a country where per capita incomes are less than 
$300 a year, piracy is an attractive business for un-
employed young men: the estimated premium for 
a successful pirate is in the region of $10-15,000 
per hijack. Profits from piracy have funded techno-
logical improvements such as fast outboard motors, 
better telecommunications, automatic weapons and 
rocket propelled grenades. Another innovation has 
been the use of “motherships” from which the small 
skiffs (which are still being used for attacks) are 
launched. Motherships are mostly hijacked fishing 
vessels and diving-boats, which are used until their 
stores run out, the crew is ransomed or the vessel’s 
use as a mothership is suspected. The use of mother-
ships has extended the radius of Somali pirates’ well 
beyond coastal waters and has reduced seasonality 
in the pattern of piracy. 
Because of a lack of infrastructure, Somali pirates 
are unable to steal cargo or ships outright: most 
hijacked vessels remain anchored several miles off 
the coast of Somalia. Bargaining over ransoms is 
mostly conducted as a hostage negotiation i.e. fo-
cused on the safe return of the crew. Ransoms have 
been rising inexorably: through repeated bargaining 
Somali pirates find out about the value of a human 
life to a ship owner. While early ransoms were in 
the region of hundreds of thousands of dollars, re-
cent figures suggest ransoms have risen to 3-7mn 
US$. Still this remains a fraction of the value of 
the cargo, hull and crew.2 Because the negotiations 
focus on the well-being of the crew, pirates tend to 
treat compliant hostages as well as possible in the 
challenging conditions of Somalia. 
Cautious naval intervention 
Naval security patrols have been formally operating 
in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia 
since August 2008. These include ships from the 
European Union’s operation Atalanta, NATO’s 
Operation Allied Protector and Operation Allied 
Provider and the US-led Combined Task Force 150 
as well as support from other nations. Efforts are 
specifically focused on securing the shipping route 
through the Gulf of Aden, which is used by around 
30,000 ships a year. The naval forces provide a 
number of services to commercial shipping. The 
first is advice about security measures to minimise 
the risk of attacks such as speed and route of travel, 
evasive actions and securing decks, based on de-
tailed analysis of past attacks. Secondly, ships are 
advised to register their transit though the Gulf of 
Aden with the naval forces and travel in a specified 
transit corridor where naval vessels operate an area 
protection system. Finally, ships that come under 
attack can request assistance from naval vessels. 
However, there is no guarantee that assistance will 
be rendered in time to prevent pirates from board-
ing as naval vessels are spaced far apart to cover 
a large area with limited resources. Once pirates 
2  For example the value of the cargo of the oil tanker Sirius Star hija-
cked in November 2009 was estimated to be in the region of US$100mn, 
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have successfully boarded a ship naval forces only 
intervene if the crew is hiding in a safe “citadel” on 
board and the ship does not have volatile cargo.3 In 
addition naval patrols investigate suspicious ves-
sels, confiscate pirates’ equipment and boats and 
detain those caught in the act of piracy. However, 
the burden of proof required for a successful convic-
tion is high and most suspected pirates are released 
immediately.4 
Despite a number of UN Security Council resolution 
legitimising the use of greater force against pirates, 
there is little appetite for a more violent solution to 
piracy.5 Firstly, it is generally not in anyone’s interest 
to risk ships’ crews and (potentially volatile) cargo 
in gun battles with pirates. Ransoms are usually a 
fraction of the value of the cargo and crew members 
are generally not deliberately harmed by pirates. 
Secondly, there are serious concerns about violating 
human rights, given that Somali and Yemeni fishing 
vessels operate legitimately in the Gulf of Aden. As 
tuna tends to congregate in the pressure wave of 
big tankers, the presence of a skiff in the shipping 
lane is not necessarily evidence of intent to hijack. 
European navies are therefore justifiably cautious 
about the treatment of suspected pirate vessels and 
can use few sanctions against crews which have 
dropped their weapons overboard and claim to be 
fishing or trading. 
A Statistical Model of Piracy in 
Somalia
The long-term success of the naval intervention is 
therefore debatable, given the potentially limited 
deterrent effect of the naval presence and the ex-
tremely lucrative nature of successful piracy. On 
the one hand the IMB reports 50 attacks abandoned 
at the arrival of naval ships and helicopters from 
January 2008 to June 2009. On the other hand de-
terrence was not perfect because there were 252 
attacks during this period (144 of these in January 
to June 2009). 72 of the 252 attempts resulted in a 
successful hijacking. 
Our statistical model of the monthly number of pi-
rate attacks in the Gulf of Aden between January 
2002 and June 2009 shows that the main determi-
nants of the number of pirate attacks in a month 
3   Post-boarding operations are rare.
4   As a short prison spell followed by asylum in a Western country was 
perceived to be additional attraction rather than a deterrent to pirates, 
the navies have handed pirates over to Kenya for trial. However, Kenya 
withdrew from the agreement on 1 April 2010.
5   Treves, T (2009): Piracy, Laws of the Sea and Use of Force: Develop-
ment off the Coast of Somalia The European Journal of International Law 
Vol. 20 no. 2 pp 399 – 414.
are the number of attacks in the previous period as 
well as past successes. Piracy thus operates like a 
successful business, where resources suitable for 
piracy continue to be employed in the business and 
profits are reinvested for expansion.
Effectiveness of naval measures in the 
Gulf of Aden
The success rate of pirates in the Gulf of Aden has 
dropped significantly as naval vessels chase pirates 
off their targets. By denying pirates resources for 
re-investing and destroying existing equipment, the 
navies have avoided the continued explosion of pi-
racy in the Gulf of Aden through 2009.  However, 
the model did not show an additional reduction in 
the number of attacks after the introduction of the 
transit corridor, meaning there is no evidence of a 
“deterrent effect”.  Keen Somali pirates continue to 
attack ships in the Gulf of Aden.6
Naval commanders stress that most of the ships 
which were successfully hijacked had ignored the 
advice of the international naval missions. Therefore 
it seems likely that navies could further reduce or 
even eliminate successful piracy in the Gulf of Aden 
with the active co-operation of the private sector.   
The first key priority is for shipping to comply with 
the guidelines concerning transit routes and times. 
The second is for crews to resist boarding to give the 
naval assistance time to arrive on the scene. Thirdly, 
if boarding is successful, the crew needs to retreat 
to a safe room to await rescue.  
However, there are a number of issues with such de-
mands on the private sector. Firstly, given the small 
probability of being attacked, some ship-owners 
will continue to disregard the security advice for 
example for reasons of time savings and fuel effi-
ciency. Secondly, captains and crews tend to prefer 
de-escalation over provocation – it is clear that in 
the event of a successful hijack co-operative crews 
generally have a better experience than those who 
resisted. Especially crews who are cheaply hired 
on short contracts are unlikely to feel sufficiently 
committed to risk their lives in defence of the ship. 
Thirdly, the insurance industry has an interest in 
the continuation of piracy, which is an important 
revenue source. Insurers are therefore unlikely to 
make demands on shipping to comply with guide-
lines which would eventually serve to cut off this 
important income stream.
6   To the extent that there is a deterrent effect of the transit corridor, it 
seems to have been offset by an efficiency gain for pirates. Crews no lon-
ger have to search for suitable targets in the whole of the Gulf of Aden, 
but simply station themselves near the transit corridor and wait until a 
lightly guarded ship appears.185
Anja Shortland
on counter-terrorism where the securing of specific 
facilities diverts terrorists to soft targets. 
At the same time the radius of attacks is increasing: 
while in 2008 ships were thought to be safe as long 
as they stayed 500nm off the Somali coast, recent 
attacks have occurred up to 1100 nm away from 
Somalia. There are simply not enough resources 
available to secure the vast areas of open sea where 
Somali pirates can potentially operate. Therefore, 
quite apart from the cost of operating the naval 
shield, there is a clear limit to what a sea-based so-
lution to the piracy problem can hope to achieve.
Land-based approaches
The root cause of piracy is ultimately on the land: 
only in countries where the state is unwilling or una-
ble to intervene in the piracy business is it possible to 
hold ships and crews for a period of several months 
until negotiations are concluded and ransoms paid. 
A strong central government upholding the rule of 
law in Somalia would therefore be the best solution 
to the issue of piracy. However, establishing any 
stable government in Mogadishu has proved beyond 
the capability of the international community since 
the civil war of the 1990s. Negotiated solutions 
over the composition of interim governments in-
variably ended in stalemates over power allocations 
between the various clans or disadvantaged clans 
immediately contested the legitimacy of power-
sharing agreements.7 In the West there is little ap-
petite for any land-based military initiatives, after 
the abandoned US and UN missions of 1994 and 
1995 respectively. What are therefore the options 
regarding strengthening stability and governance 
in the regions? 
It is clear that regional elites (based on alliances 
of expatriate-funded businesses, mosques and clan 
elders) benefit financially from piracy and are 
likely to resist an end to this lucrative business. 
Interestingly our statistical model also shows that 
pirates benefit from improvements in local political 
stability and contract security. Piracy is after all a 
business, and the ability of pirates to keep their hos-
tages guarded from rival groups and in good physi-
cal condition improves with security in the country. 
Therefore, while a strong state could result in the 
desired outcome of an end to piracy, a less ambi-
tious policy of partial stabilisation may in fact result 
in an improved business environment for pirates. 
In any case, the most likely alliance which could 
form a stable government in Somalia would be radi-
cal Islamist. While a previous short-lived Islamist 
7   Menkhaus, K (2007b): The Crisis in Somalia: Tragedy in five Acts, 
African Affairs 106/204 pp 357-390.
Substitution effects
Even if the Gulf of Aden was successfully secured, 
this would be likely to result in increased substitu-
tion to open seas piracy. The statistical model of 
the incidence of the number of pirate attacks in the 
Somali Basin shows a large increase in piracy in 
the open seas after the introduction of the transit 
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administration (the UIC in 2006) did ban piracy under sharia law, recent evidence 
suggests that Mosques are accepting funds from pirates and it is at least possible 
that even a government of Islamist hue would tolerate if not sponsor piracy. 
The most promising and realistic route for approaching the problem from the 
land-side is therefore to agree the establishment of an effective Somali coastguard 
with local elites. Firstly, this would provide an income stream for young men from 
the coastal communities where other forms of well-paid employment are scarce. 
Secondly, it would protect Somali fishing rights vis-à-vis the international fishing 
fleets (thereby reducing the legitimacy of piracy in the eyes of the Somali popula-
tion). Thirdly, Somalis have better information and additionally could pursue pirates 
and their prey in territorial waters and on land, raising the risks for would-be pirates. 
There are two issues that would need to be resolved before such an approach is 
taken. Firstly, the international community would need to fund this coastguard to 
ensure its continued loyalty. Simply providing fast ships and weapons to Somalis 
and training them in their use could ultimately prove counterproductive. Secondly, 
the issue of local corruption needs to be addressed to ensure that the coastguards’ 
salaries are actually paid and that arrested pirates are properly detained and tried. 
Conclusions 
Navies have succeeded in containing piracy in the Gulf of Aden at a level where 
it is a nuisance rather than a significant threat to commercial shipping. Restrained 
use of force has resulted in an equilibrium where piracy is conducted with minimal 
damage to cargo and human life. It is not in anyone’s interest to deviate from these 
rules of the game and escalate the violence. 
However, the naval intervention has not resolved the underlying problem that 
successful piracy is a hugely lucrative business in a country where there are few 
opportunities for young men to find gainful employment. Under current rules of 
engagement many pirates are not deterred from trying their luck despite the naval 
presence, while those who fear detention and trial simply avoid the well secured 
area of the Gulf of Aden and hunt further afield. 
As long as there is no stable government to enforce the rule of law in Somalia, 
establishing and funding Somali coastguards would appear to be the most cost-
effective and promising solution to the piracy problem in Somalia. Not only would 
it directly offer gainful employment to former pirates, but it would also provide 
new opportunities for Somali fishermen: the years of piracy threats have resulted 
in a near miraculous recovery of tuna stocks off the coast of Somalia. 
(First published as “Piraterie in Somalia: Ein gutes Geschäft für Viele”, in: Wochenbericht 
des DIW Berlin Nr. 29/2010.) 